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AN UNTRUSTWORTHY PRESUMPTION:
REPLACING THE MOENCH PRESUMPTION
WITH A SOUND STANDARD FOR STOCKDROP LITIGATION
CHRISTOPHER J. BRYANT†
INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty million private employees participate in retirement
plans that offer their employers’ stock (company stock) as a required
1
or optional investment. About twenty million of those employees
2
invest in company stock. In the aggregate, their retirement plans
3
contain more than $1 trillion in company stock, and average about
4
$50,000 individually. Over the past two decades, employees who have
invested in company stock through these plans have filed numerous
lawsuits when the prices of their companies’ stocks—and the values of
5
their retirement accounts—drop. The employees allege that plan
Copyright © 2013 Christopher J. Bryant (christopher.bryant@lawnet.duke.edu).
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2014; Duke University, A.B. in
economics, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Deborah DeMott for advising me through the Note
process, Jacob Charles for being a great friend and top-notch note editor, and everyone who put
up with me talking about ERISA and the Moench presumption.
1. See JACK VANDERHEI, ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 401(K)
PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 2011 26 (2012)
(noting that the sample database contained 9.2 Million 401(k) plan participants, which
represents approximately half of the universe of plan participants); Florence Olsen, ESOPs:
Report Lists Assets of About $870 Billion Held in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 39 PENS. &
BENEFITS R. 345 (Feb. 2, 2012) (noting that around 10 million employees participate in ESOPs).
2. See VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (noting that 4.6 million surveyed
participants actually invest in company stock); A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership,
NAT’L CENTER FOR EMPL. OWNERSHIP (Feb. 2012), http://www.nceo.org/articles/statisticalprofile-employee-ownership (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (noting that about fifteen million
individuals participate in plans that invest exclusively or primarily in company stock).
3. Olsen, supra note 1.
4. Some contain substantially more, others substantially less. See VanDerhi et al., supra
note 1, at 26 (noting that the percent of money invested in company stock by each 401(k) plan
participant varies from 0 percent to greater than 80 percent).
5. See generally Michael J. Dell & Michael J. Nassau, Stock Drop Cases and the
Presumption of Prudence: When it Applies, How it is Overcome, J. RETIRE. PLAN., Nov.–Dec.
2009, at 13 (describing several of the more prominent cases). The defense bar refers to these
cases with the “catchy and pejorative moniker” of “stock-drop” cases. See Derek W. Loeser,
Erin M. Riley, & Benjamin Gould, 2010 ERISA Employer Stock Cases: The Good, the Bad, and
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administrators breached their fiduciary duties by continuing to invest
in company stock or failing to warn employees of an impending drop
in stock prices. Because the Employee Retirement Income Security
6
Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs the administration of these retirement
7
plans, it serves as the source for the standards courts use to
adjudicate these claims.
ERISA outlines a prudent person standard of care for retirement
plan fiduciaries, and lists duties designed to ensure that fiduciaries act
8
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.” These
include the duties to: (1) act “for the exclusive purpose of . . .
providing benefits to [plan] participants and their beneficiaries,”
(2) employ the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” that a prudential
person acting in a similar capacity would use to conduct a similar
plan, (3) follow plan documents to the extent that they do not conflict
with ERISA, and (4) diversify plan investments to minimize the risk
9
of large losses unless diversification would be imprudent.
ERISA exempts the fiduciaries of most plans that contain
10
company stock from the duty to diversify. The Supreme Court has
not yet offered the definitive interpretation of this provision, but
11
since the Third Circuit decided Moench v. Robertson in 1995, circuit
courts have consistently held that this exemption establishes a broad
presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of plans designed to invest in
12
company stock. This is commonly referred to as the Moench
presumption.
Under the Moench presumption, judicial review of fiduciaries’
decisions to purchase, hold, or sell company stock is subject to an
13
abuse-of-discretion standard.
To overcome the Moench
presumption, plaintiffs must show the existence of a “dire situation”
that threatens a company’s viability or renders the stock essentially

the In Between—Plaintiffs’ Perspective, PENS. & BENEFITS DAILY, 01/28/2011, at 1, 2. Plaintiffs
refer to these cases as employer stock cases. Id. This Note uses the term stock-drop cases for
consistency and its visually descriptive nature, but does not align itself with either bar.
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
7. See Part I.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
9. Id.
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
11. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (1995).
12. See Part II.B.
13. Moench, 62 F.3d at 571. For more discussion, see Part II.
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14

worthless. Plaintiffs in stock-drop cases have experienced great
15
difficulty in meeting this standard, which has effectively insulated
16
fiduciaries from liability in all but the most extreme circumstances.
Consider the following examples, which are based on actual stockdrop cases:
1. Plan fiduciaries have observed Big Finance, Inc.
substantially increase its ties to the risky subprime
securities market over the past few years, but
continue to purchase and hold company stock. Plan
documents require the fiduciaries to invest 20 percent
of the plan assets in company stock. The stock price
17
drops by more than 50 percent.
2. The plan documents for Electronic Chain Stores call
for fiduciaries to invest up to 50 percent of plan funds
in company stock. Despite knowing that the company
made false statements about its earnings and
inventory, plan fiduciaries continue to invest in
company stock. When Electronic Chain Store takes
actions inconsistent with its previous statements, the
18
stock price drops 8 percent.
3. Global Eyecare Corporation’s foreign subsidiaries’
dishonest accounting practices have inflated its stock
price. In addition, one of its major products is causing
eye infections in markets around the world and will

14. See, e.g., Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We cannot agree,
however, that these developments, or the corresponding drop in stock price, created the type of
dire situation which would require defendants to disobey the terms of the Plans . . . .”); Part II.
15. See Corey Rosen, Courts Continue to Favor Defendants in Recent ‘Stock Drop' Cases,
39 PENS. & BENEFITS R. 77 (Jan. 10, 2012) (“[S]ince July of 2010, courts have largely continued
to favor defendants.”).
16. See In re Fannie Mae 2008 ERISA Litig., 09 CIV. 1350 PAC, 2012 WL 5198463, at *4–
5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (noting that if evidence of the growing rate of foreclosures, concerns
about the housing market, concerns about lessened underwriting standards, claims that there
would be further deterioration of the housing market in the event of a bubble bursting, concerns
about increased exposure to the subprime market, internal risk officers’ warning, and a decrease
in plan assets of more than 90 percent was not sufficient to overcome the Moench presumption,
“it is not clear what would be sufficient”).
17. In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
475 (2012).
18. In re RadioShack Corp. “ERISA” Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
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need to be recalled. Plan fiduciaries know this
information, but they continue to invest 100 percent
of plan funds in company stock. Plan participants
allege that the fraudulent accounting practices and
the recall have caused the stock price to drop by 25
percent, and that plan fiduciaries breached their duty
19
to deviate from the terms of the plan.
4. The terms of Superpower Energy’s plan require
nearly 100 percent investment in company stock. Plan
fiduciaries know that Superpower Energy’s stock
trading practices over the period of two years have
artificially inflated the price of the company stock,
but they continue to follow the plan terms and invest
in company stock. When the trading practices—the
same ones used by Enron—become public
knowledge, the stock price drops by more than 40
20
percent.
In each of the previous scenarios, the plaintiffs failed to
overcome the Moench presumption. Fiduciaries and other
commentators have faulted the standard because it establishes duties
21
that are contrary to ERISA’s provisions and provides inadequate
22
guidance to the courts.
This Note argues that the Moench presumption—as currently
applied by the courts—is unsound in both theory and practice
because it is unsupported by legal doctrine and public policy. The
Note proposes that the Moench presumption should be replaced by a
19. In re Bausch & Lomb Inc. ERISA Litig., 06-CV-6297, 2008 WL 5234281 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2008).
20. Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008).
21. See Petition for Writ of Certiorati, Robertson v. Moench, 1995 WL 17036143 (No. 95917) (“The decision below frustrates that Congressional intent by holding that ESOP fiduciaries
may be sued under ERISA for making the very investment in employer securities that ESOPs
are designed to make.”).
22. See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge Of Company Stock
Transactions For Directors' Duties Of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, (2006) (“Beyond the
Moench presumption of prudence, which is troubling in itself, the ERISA employer stock cases
have not established any clear guidance as to what factual allegations present a threat of
fiduciary breach of loyalty.”) (footnote omitted); cf. In re Fannie Mae 2008 ERISA Litig., 09
CIV. 1350 PAC, 2012 WL 5198463, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (noting that the Second
Circuit provided no clear guidance for determining whether a plaintiff has overcome the
presumption of prudence).
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narrowly defined reasonableness standard that is more in line with
ERISA’s prudent person standard. Simply stopping the discussion
here, however, places plan fiduciaries in an unenviable position. If
they fail to deviate from the plan terms, they will be subject to
liability for breach of fiduciary duty. But if fiduciaries deviate from
the terms of the plan, they risk exposing plan participants and the
plan itself to new and substantial tax liabilities—at least in theory—
which could constitute additional breaches of fiduciary duty.
This Note identifies two potential solutions to the fiduciaries’
problem. First, Congress could amend the tax provisions governing
the plans in question so that a fiduciary’s deviation from plan terms
under these circumstances does not create any new tax liabilities.
Alternatively, plan drafters could include language instructing plan
fiduciaries to stop investing in company stock when the
reasonableness standard renders continued investment in company
stock imprudent. Replacing the Moench presumption and protecting
well-intentioned fiduciaries through legislative or practical changes
would simultaneously provide litigants—and the courts—with an
objective framework to assess stock-drop claims, protect the
retirement assets of private employees, and dissuade employers from
engaging in activities that are legally, ethically, or financially
questionable.
The Moench presumption rests on the premise that “basic
principles of trust law require that the interpretation of the terms of
23
the trust be controlled by the settlor’s intent.” Although this
24
statement is true, the court did not accurately identify or define the
25
settlor’s intent in Moench. A settlor’s intent is often coextensive with
a plain language interpretation of the written terms of the trust in
traditional trust law, but this proposition does not necessarily hold
when a statutory context requires the inclusion of certain language
and the consideration of underlying policy concerns. Thus, the
Moench court was imprecise in determining whether the fiduciaries’
actions fulfilled the settlor’s intent. Several doctrinally suspect
decisions followed Moench because no circuit court has revisited
Moench’s analysis of the underlying trust law.

23. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995).
24. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 (2003) (“The phrase “terms of the trust” means the
manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust provisions expressed . . . .”).
25. See Part II.D.
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From a public policy perspective, the Moench presumption is
also deficient. Because the framework lacks solid doctrinal grounding,
courts have been forced to develop the presumption’s contours
26
As a
without true common-law or statutory guideposts.
consequence, fiduciaries do not know the true scope of their
responsibilities and potential litigants cannot approach a dispute
enlightened with a clear understanding of the law and how it will be
applied, which increases inefficiencies and costs for all interested
parties.
Perhaps most importantly, the Moench presumption does little to
nothing to curb business conduct that has a direct and detrimental
impact on stock prices and employees’ retirement accounts.
Recognizing that making “[plan] fiduciaries virtual guarantors of . . .
financial success” would make retirement plans that hold company
stock unattractive options for corporate plan sponsors, the Third
Circuit declined to impose any semblance of strict judicial second27
guessing. But instead of encouraging businesses to make prudent
decision by enabling retirement plan fiduciaries to make truly
prudent investments, the Moench presumption places the retirement
assets of millions of private employees at risk by insulating fiduciaries
from any meaningful judicial review.
The literature almost uniformly acknowledges the high bar
28
plaintiffs face in bringing stock-drop suits, but authors’ normative
characterizations of the Moench presumption and stock-drop cases
vary. On the heels of Moench v. Robertson, two prescient student
notes decried the opinion for its doctrinal problems and the
implications of the resulting relaxation of ERISA’s fiduciary
29
standards. But an article written just over a decade after the decision
30
lauded Moench for its usefulness as a standard, despite its flaws,

26. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
27. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995).
28. See, e.g., Dell, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that the court has continually favored stockdrop defendants).
29. Kenneth Hayes, Note, Moench v. Robertson: When Must an Esop Fiduciary Abandon
A Sinking Ship?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1231 (1997) (providing an early critique of the decision
and lamenting the high burden of proof it placed on plaintiffs); John M. Wilson, Note, Are All
ERISA Fiduciaries Created Alike? Moench v. Robertson, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 255 (1996)
(criticizing the decision for its failure to follow precedent, disregard for other ERISA duties,
and a failure to recognize important public policy implications).
30. See Craig C. Martin, Matthew J. Renaud, and Omar R. Akbar, What's Up On StockDrops? Moench Revisited, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 634 (2006) (arguing that Moench
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while another article argues that stock-drop and securities suits are
redundant, and—because plaintiffs’ lawyers file these suits only to fee
shop—all
stock-drop
litigation
involving
stock
price
misrepresentation should be pursued through securities laws
31
litigation, not ERISA suits. Many commentators acknowledge the
difficulty in creating an appropriate standard to which to subject plan
32
fiduciaries, but none proposes a doctrinally sound alternative to the
33
Moench presumption.
This Note is the first to articulate a doctrinally sound framework
that protects both plan participants and plan fiduciaries and that is
also supported by the common law of trusts, ERISA’s prudent person
standard, and relevant policy considerations. Part I briefly introduces
ERISA and retirement plans that contain company stock. Part II then
traces the origins and development of the Moench presumption,
analyzing its theoretical and practical effectiveness and limitations.
Next, Part III proposes replacing the Moench presumption with an
objectively defined reasonableness standard fully grounded in the law
of trusts. Finally, Part IV puts the proposed standard through the
paces, contrasting its effectiveness with the Moench presumption.

provides a useful standard that should apply even though its logical extension “contradicts
ERISA’s explicit exemption from the duty to diversify”).
31. Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should The Securities Exchange Act Be The Sole
Federal Remedy For An ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation Of The Value Of Public Employer
Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Neil A. Capobianco & Jose Martin Jara, Hot Topics in ERISA Litigation:
From Ongoing Class Action Challenges To The Upcoming Fee Disclosure Deluge, 2011 WL
190437, at *8 (“While the appropriate standard for stock drop litigation is still up in the air,
there is virtually no available alternate standard except for Moench. No court has come up with
any other viable standard.”); Ellen M. Doyle, Stephen M. Pincus, Restoring Retirement Nest
Eggs: Managers of 401(k) Retirement Plans Owe a Fiduciary Duty of Care, Loyalty, and
Prudence to Plan Participants. When Fiduciaries Breach These Duties, Participants Can Recover
Their Losses through an ERISA Class Action, 45-APR Trial 46 (2009) (briefly discussing the
difficulty in “determining the right point, or even range of right points, for an ESOP fiduciary to
break the plan and start diversifying”).
33. The only recent work to propose an alternative standard is Meredith L. Gray’s note, A
Presumption Without Prudence: Replacing Moench v. Robertson With A Prudent “When In
Doubt, Don't” Standard For ESOP And 401(K) Company Stock Fund Fiduciaries, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 907. Although Gray’s proposed “When in doubt, don’t” standard is appealing from a
policy perspective, it fails to address ERISA’s exemption of EIAPs from the duty to diversify.
The standard, which she equates to a chef “vouching for the integrity of everything on her
menu” or fiduciaries “invest[ing] their own mother's core retirement savings in company stock
without reasonable assurance that the investment would not be lost,” also lacks both doctrinal
support and meaningful objective guidance for plan fiduciaries. Id. at 948.
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I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND:
ERISA AND ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS
To understand the Moench presumption’s role and shortcomings,
one must begin with the basics of ERISA and the eligible individual
account plans (EIAPs) that ERISA exempts from the duty to
diversify. This Part briefly reviews the structure of ERISA, introduces
the most common EIAPs, and discusses the rationale behind
investing in company stock.
A. A Brief Overview of ERISA
ERISA regulates the creation, administration, amendment, and
34
termination of certain employer-provided employee benefit plans.
During the century leading up to 1974, a mix of state and federal laws
35
governed these plans. Enacted to protect employee benefit plans
36
from abuse, ERISA’s broad preemption clause means that federal
law now governs when a case “relates to” a covered employee benefit
37
plan.
38
ERISA borrows heavily from the language and law of trusts.
Covered retirement plans generally take the form of trusts, the
fiduciaries of covered retirement plans generally function as trustees,
39
and employees and retirees are beneficiaries. ERISA imposes
certain duties on plan fiduciaries, including the duty of loyalty, the
duty of prudence, the duty to diversify plan assets, and the duty to
40
follow plan terms that do not violate ERISA. Under ERISA, the
Secretary of Labor, other fiduciaries, plan participants, and
41
beneficiaries may all sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Although the
statutory framework precludes individual compensation in most

34. ERISA covers employee welfare plans like health benefits, and employee benefit plans
like traditional pensions, employee stock ownership plans, 401(k) plans, and some 403(b) plans.
It does not cover government plans, church plans, or plans required to remain compliant with
workers’ compensation laws. PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, ERISA: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 2.01 n.1 (3d ed. 2008).
35. Id. § 1.02.
36. Id. § 1.04.
37. Id. § 9.01.
38. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA abounds
with the language and terminology of trust law.”) (citing several provisions).
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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42

scenarios, fiduciaries who breach their duties are personally liable to
43
the plan for losses causally connected to the breach.
B.

Eligible Individual Account Plans (EIAPs)

Eligible Individual Account Plans (EIAPs) are a type of
employee pension benefit covered by ERISA. Unlike the traditional
44
pensions common through the middle of the twentieth century, these
plans do not provide retirees with guaranteed defined benefits upon
retirement. Instead, EIAPs are defined contribution plans that
require employers to pay a defined amount into each eligible
45
employee’s retirement account at specified intervals. Employees
then invest this money in various assets through a menu of plans
offered by their employers, which exposes their retirement accounts
46
to the risks and rewards inherent in each investment. When
employees retire, they have a choice between receiving a lump sum
payment or placing the amount in their EIAPs into individual
47
retirement accounts (IRAs). ERISA exempts EIAP trustees from
48
the duty to diversify, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) affords
special tax treatment to EIAPs, their participants, and the businesses
that contribute to them. For example, plans need not pay taxes on the
49
earnings made by retirement plans until they are distributed, the
IRS does not deem plan participants’ EIAP contributions to be
50
taxable income until it is distributed, and employers may take
51
deductions for contributions to EIAPs. The two most common
EIAPs are Employer Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and 401(k)

42. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4); cf. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 232
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs may seek money damages on behalf of the fund, notwithstanding the
fact the alleged fiduciary violations affected only a subset of the saving plan's participants.”).
43. See SCHNEIDER ET. AL, supra note 34, § 8.04[B] (discussing proper defendants in
ERISA civil enforcement actions).
44. Id. § 3.03[A].
45. Id. § 3.03[B].
46. Id.
47. Id. §§ 3.11–3.12. Employees may also receive distributions from their plans before they
retire, but that is beyond the scope of this Note.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
49. 26 U.S.C. § 402(a).
50. Id.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 404(a).
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52

plans. Over 50 percent of the nonfarm private workforce has access
53
to an EIAP.
54

1. ESOPs. About 10 million employees participate in ESOPs.
To maintain their favorable tax status, ESOPs must “invest primarily
55
in qualifying employer securities.” Accordingly, plans invest
exclusively in company stock or in a combination of cash and
56
company stock. ESOPs are attractive for several reasons. Some
57
companies use ESOPs as a mechanism to motivate their employees.
Many believe an ESOP incentivizes employees to take an interest in
the positive performance of the company’s stock by directly linking
58
employees’ wealth to the price of company stock. In addition,
59
companies also use the favorable tax treatment of ESOPs to finance
strategic corporate moves. For example, ESOPs can be used as an
anti-takeover defensive strategy or to buy shares of a departing
60
owner’s stock in a closely held company. Finally, although it does
not provide funding for retirement in amounts as definite as the
income generated by a traditional pension plan, the rationale for an
ESOP’s existence is, in no small part, to provide employees with
retirement income.

52. SCHNEIDER ET. AL, supra note 34, § 3.03[B].
53. See William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based Retirement
Benefits,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
(Sept.
29,
2011),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm.
54. Olsen, supra note 1.
55. 26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7).
56. Joel Hobbs, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), Including S Corporation
ESOPs and Anti Abuse Measures, 8-7–8-9, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/epchd804.pdf.
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. Although this is a commonly held view, the empirical research supporting this belief is
mixed. Compare Douglas Kruse, Research Evidence on Prevalence and Effects of Employee
Ownership
(2002),
http://www.nceo.org/articles/research-prevalence-effects-employeeownership (“Most studies find higher organizational commitment and identification under
employee ownership, while studies are mixed between favorable and neutral findings on job
satisfaction, motivation, and other behavioral measures.”) with id. (“There is clearly no
automatic improvement of attitudes and behavior associated with being simply an employeeowner.”).
59. See notes 49–51.
60. Hobbs, supra note 56, at 8-9.
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61

2. 401(k) Plans. Since their inception in 1981, 401(k) plans have
become one of the most popular forms of retirement savings for
62
private employees. In these plans, employees direct employers to
place a portion of their pre-tax earnings into an individual account in
63
lieu of cash compensation. Employers often match this amount, up
64
to a statutory limit. The matching component of the 401(k) plans
65
incentivizes employees to maximize their contributions. These plans
typically offer several investment options, including stocks, bonds,
66
funds, and other investment vehicles such as company stock. In 2010,
approximately 20 million individuals participated in 401(k) plan that
offered company stock as an investment option, and about half of
67
these plan participants actually invested in company stock.
II. THE MOENCH PRESUMPTION OF PRUDENCE
As first articulated by the Third Circuit, the Moench
presumption states “an ESOP fiduciary who invests the assets in
employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently
68
with ERISA by virtue of that decision.” Plaintiffs may rebut this
presumption by introducing evidence of circumstances unknown to
the settlor that would “defeat or substantially impair the purposes of
69
the trust.”
This Part first reviews the seminal case of Moench v. Robertson
and traces the adoption and expansion of the Moench presumption at
the circuit court level. It then analyzes whether the presumption has
adequately addressed the questions and concerns the Third Circuit

61. The Revenue Act of 1978 established the structure for 401(k) plans. Pub. L. 95-600, 92
Stat. 2763. The IRS did not issue regulations for these plans until 1981.
62. 401k Retirement Plans, NATIONWIDE, http://www.nationwide.com/401k-retirementplans.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2).
64. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(m).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(4)(A) (permitting employees to use matching contributions to
incentivize employee participation in 401(k) plans).
66. See
Smart
401(k)
Investing:
Investing
in
Your
401(k),
FINRA
http://www.finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/Retirement/Smart401kInvesting/investing/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013) (“The average plan offers between 8 and 12 [investment]
alternatives . . . .”).
67. VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26.
68. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995).
69. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) § 227, cmt. g).
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raised. Part II concludes by challenging the presumption’s doctrinal
soundness.
A. Moench v. Robertson
In 1992, Charles Moench, a former employee who had
participated in the ESOP of his employer (Statewide) during the
preceding three years filed a class action suit on behalf of the
70
Statewide ESOP. Between July 1989 and May 1991, the price of
71
Statewide stock fell from $19.25 to less than $0.25. Moench’s
amended complaint included claims against Statewide’s ESOP
Committee—the plan fiduciaries—for breaches of fiduciary duty for
continuing to acquire company stock during the price drop and failing
72
to warn plan participants about “Statewide’s condition.” He also
sought to hold the ESOP Committee liable for their co-fiduciaries’
73
alleged breaches of duty.
The district court held that according to plan documents, the
ESOP Committee—which acknowledged its role as an ERISA
fiduciary—lacked the discretion to invest ESOP funds in anything
74
other than company stock. Because the plan was compliant with
ERISA, the district court dismissed the breach of fiduciary claims on
75
a summary judgment motion. On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated
the district court’s grant of the defendant’s summary judgment
76
motion. But this was far from a victory for Mr. Moench and the
Statewide ESOP.
The Third Circuit “look[ed] to the common law of trusts for
77
guidance” in adjudicating the matter. After acknowledging the basic
principle that a settlor’s intent controls interpretation of the terms of
the trust, the court stated that “ignoring the general intent behind
[ESOPs] in favor of giving beneficiaries the maximum opportunity to
78
recover their losses” failed to honor the principle. It then addressed
the issue of asset diversification, noting that the duty to diversify is
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 570.
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waivable in the common law of trusts. Because ERISA explicitly
waived the duty to diversify, and, as a general rule, “ESOP fiduciaries
should not be subject to breach-of-duty liability for investing plan
assets in the manner and for the . . . purposes that Congress
80
intended,” the court declined to apply a reasonableness standard of
81
review to the ESOP Committee’s investment decisions.
Next, the court looked to the language of the ESOP’s documents,
which directed the ESOP Committee to primarily invest in company
stock, to determine the appropriate standard at which to hold plan
fiduciaries liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. The court stated that
fiduciaries had an obligation to follow a mandatory investment
directive, unless doing so was impossible or illegal or a court
82
approved a deviation. In contrast, fiduciaries with permissive
investment directives needed to “exercise care, skill, and caution in
83
making decisions to obtain or acquire the investment.” Noting that
ESOP fiduciaries are “not absolutely required to invest in employer
securities but [are] more than simply permitted to make such
84
investments,” the court established a standard falling squarely in the
middle. Instead of making ESOP fiduciaries’ continued investment in
company stock “immune from judicial inquiry” or subjecting their
investment decisions to “a de novo review,” the court determined
that they should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prudence,
85
subject only to an abuse of discretion standard.
B. Additional
Presumption

Circuit

Courts

Have

Adopted

the

Moench

Since 1995, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have followed the Third Circuit’s lead and applied
some variation of the Moench presumption of prudence in stock-drop
86
suits. Every appellate court to consider the Moench presumption has
79. Id. at 571 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227(b) [from the Prudent Investor
Rule]).
80. Id. (quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670 (8th Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks
removed and omission in original).
81. See id. at 572 (establishing the abuse of discretion standard).
82. Id. at 571 (citing Restatement (Third) § 228, cmt. d [Prudent Investor Rule]).
83. Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) § 228, cmt. f [Prudent Investor Rule]).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 572.
86. See White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714 F.3d 980, 987–97 (7th Cir. 2013) (adopting
the Moench presumption of prudence in stock-drop cases); Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679
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adopted it. The Second Circuit, a recent adopter of the Moench
presumption, formulated it as follows:
[O]nly circumstances placing the employer in a dire situation that
was objectively unforeseeable by the settlor could require
fiduciaries to override plan terms. The presumption is to serve as
a substantial shield that should protect fiduciaries from liability
where there is room for reasonable fiduciaries to disagree as to
whether they are bound to divest from company stock. The test of
prudence is . . . one of conduct rather than results, and the abuse
of discretion standard ensures that a fiduciary’s conduct cannot be
second-guessed so long as it is reasonable.88

As courts have applied the Moench presumption to new facts,
they have elaborated on its scope and effect. Moench v. Robertson
involved only an ESOP, but subsequent cases extended the Moench
89
presumption to all EIAPs. Courts have struggled to outline criteria
for facts that would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of
90
prudence and overcome the abuse of discretion standard. To date,
the only potentially significant circuit split is whether the Moench
91
presumption is a pleading or evidentiary standard. The Supreme
Court declined a petition for certiorari that addressed the issue in the

F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 475 (2012) (same); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870
(9th Cir. 2010) (same); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008) (same);
Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
87. In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d at 138 (2d Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit initially
declined to adopt the Moench presumption, but it did not has since joined the other circuits.
88. In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
475 (U.S. 2012) (quoting several cases) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
89. See Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2007) (extending the Moench
presumption to all EIAPs based on ERISA’s exemption of all EIAPs from the duty to
diversify). Subsequent cases have recognized this precedent. E.g., In re RadioShack
Corp. “ERISA” Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that it was irrelevant
whether certain retirement plans qualified as ESOPs since the Moench presumption extended to
all EIAPs).
90. See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
plaintiffs can take some solace from the fact that determining the ‘right’ point, or even range of
‘right’ points, for an ESOP fiduciary to break the plan and start diversifying may be beyond the
practical capacity of the courts to determine.”).
91. In Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Second
Circuit, which had recently adopted the Moench presumption, in applying it at the motion to
dismiss stage. 671 F.3d 585, 592 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 12-256, 2012 WL 4009309 (Dec. 3,
2012).
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2012 October Term, but granted certiorari in a relevant case one
93
year later.
C.

Did Proposed Alternatives Pose Significant Problems?

In Moench, the court stated that creating a rebuttable
presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries was more palatable
than the alternatives suggested by the plan plaintiff or the
94
Department of Labor. The court identified several problems it
believed the Department of Loabor’s suggested standards would
leave unsolved:
[B]y subjecting an ERISA fiduciary’s decision to invest in
employer stock to strict judicial scrutiny, we essentially would
render meaningless the ERISA provision excepting ESOPs from
the duty to diversify. Moreover, we would risk transforming
ESOPs into ordinary pension benefit plans, which then would
frustrate Congress’ desire to encourage employee ownership.
After all, why would an employer establish an ESOP if its
compliance with the purpose and terms of the plan could subject it
to strict judicial second-guessing?95

At a minimum, any acceptable standard would need to address
these issues, and, according to the Third Circuit, the Moench
presumption fit the bill. But was it ever a real possibility that the duty
to diversify would be obviated or that ESOPs would be transformed
into “ordinary pension benefit plans?” The answers, respectively, are
no and maybe.
The court overemphasized the significance of ERISA’s
exemption of trustees from the duty to diversify. In the common law
96
of trusts, the duty to diversify encapsulates modern portfolio theory.
Because of market, industry, and firm risk, a failure to adequately
diversify trust assets is imprudent unless some special circumstance

92. Id.
93. Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part,
No. 12-751, 2013 WL 6510745 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2013).
94. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995).
95. Id.
96. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 646–47 (1996) (noting that the Uniform Prudent Investors
Act—which lays out many conceps involved in the common law of trusts—emphasizes
diversification of assets because of modern portfolio theory).
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warrants a highly concentrated investment. The duty to diversify is a
default rule, meaning that settlors may direct trustees to make
98
noncapricious, undiversified investments. When plaintiffs bring a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty for the imprudent continued
investment in company stock, it is distinct from a claim for failure to
99
diversify under the default rule. When plaintiffs sue fiduciaries for
continued investment in company stocks, they are suing because they
believe the investment was imprudent in light of the circumstances,
not because failure to diversify is per se imprudent. The fact that
100
other courts have not followed Moench’s formalistic interpretation
demonstrates that the risk of obviating the exemption from the duty
to diversify was minimal at best. But courts have continued to
highlight the risk of turning ESOPs into “ordinary pension benefit
plans” through increased judicial scrutiny of fiduciaries’ decisions to
101
continue to invest in company stock.
D. Settlor’s Intent or Congressional Intent?
In Moench, the Third Circuit superimposed the common law of
trusts over ERISA’s statutory provisions to determine the scope of
102
ESOP fiduciaries’ duties. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, it
noted that “ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of
103
trust law,” and ERISA’s legislative history made it clear that
Congress intended to task ERISA fiduciaries with the duties that

97. Id. at 647.
98. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105,
1112 (2004).
99. See Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We do not
read the Moench presumption to apply to a ‘diversification’ claim, because a presumption of
prudence is unnecessary where fiduciaries are not subject to a prudence requirement to begin
with. On the other hand, where employer stock is only one of the possible plan investments, and
plaintiffs assert a claim that the fiduciary should have divested the plan of employer stock, the
fiduciaries would be entitled to the presumption that investment in employer stock was
prudent.”).
100. See, e.g., id. (declining to equate a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty stemming from
continued investment in company stock with a simple claim for failure to diversify investments).
101. See, e.g., In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 475 (U.S. 2012) (adopting the Moench presumption, in part, because “it provides the
best accommodation between the competing ERISA values of protecting retirement assets and
encouraging investment in employer stock”).
102. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 1995).
103. Id. (quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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originated in trust law. It also noted that trust law principles require
that the settlor’s intent control its interpretation of the terms of the
trust. To provide support for the Moench presumption, the Third
Circuit made one major doctrinal move: defining the settlor’s intent
as increasing employee ownership through investing in company
105
stock. Upon close inspection, this definition appears to be too
narrow.
106
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the phrase “terms
of the trust” as any words or actions that manifest the settlor’s
107
externally expressed intent at the time the trust was created. The
comments provide that the terms of the trust “may be determined by
interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all
108
the circumstances.” Potentially relevant circumstances include the
relationship between the settlor and beneficiaries, their financial
circumstances, the type of property included in the trust, business
custom, and the “circumstances under which the trust is to be
109
administered.”
But the Moench court conducted limited inquiries into the words
or actions of Statewide or its agents at the time of the ESOP’s
creation. In fact, the only reference to Statewide’s words or actions at
the time of the ESOP’s creation is the fact that plan documents
110
included the directive to invest “primarily” in company stock. But
when it interpreted the terms of the plan, the court appeared to
conflate the trust law concept of settlor’s intent—the words, actions,
and circumstances that manifest the settlor’s intent—with boilerplate
plan language. This language signifies no more than the fact that
Statewide intended the trust to take the form of an ESOP. Federal
regulations require all ESOP documents to include such

104. Id.
105. See id. at 568.
106. This Note uses the Restatement (Second) of Trusts to analyze the court’s decision and
to create a new standard for EIAP fiduciaries because the Restatement (Third) was incomplete
when Moench was decided. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the emerging benefit-thebeneficiaries rule provide additional support for the proposed standard, but that is beyond the
scope of this Note.
107. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 (1959).
108. Id. § 4, cmt. a.
109. Id.
110. See Moench, 62 F.3d at 567 (“For instance, the plan documents state that assets are to
be invested primarily in Statewide stock. Therefore, it seems counterintuitive for the Committee
to interpret the plan as requiring it to invest exclusively in Statewide stock.”).
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terminology. Instead of providing some insight into the underlying
purpose of the Statewide ESOP, the “primarily” language shows only
that Statewide intended to set up a plan that complied with federal
regulations.
In defining the settlor’s intent, the court also singled out one of
the circumstances under which the Statewide ESOP was to be
administered. The court focused, albeit quite narrowly, on the ESOPs
role within ERISA’s statutory framework. After distinguishing
ESOPs from traditional pension plans and noting that ESOPs’ lack of
diversification placed employees’ retirement assets at a greater risk
112
than plans subject to ERISA’s diversification requirements, the
court briefly discussed the “original rationale” behind the ESOP—
113
”expanding the national capital base among employees.” Stopping
just short of explicitly stating that increased employee ownership of
companies was the settlor’s intent, the court stated that the extent of
ESOP fiduciaries’ duties should conform to the “general intent
114
behind such plans.”
The court failed adequately to assess the words, actions, and
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Statewide ESOP. In
the court’s eyes, the prescribed means of investment—primarily
purchasing company stock—was the ESOP’s purpose. But it
improperly imputed special meaning to a boilerplate phrase and
substituted congressional intent for settlor’s intent.
III. DEVELOPING A NEW STANDARD
Because ERISA is replete with the language of trusts, trust law
should serve as the foundation for any new standard of fiduciary
115
obligation. Determining the full extent of a trustee’s fiduciary duty
requires first identifying the settlor’s intent, or purpose, for creating
116
the trust. When the express terms of the trust no longer reflect the
111. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11(b) (“A plan constitutes an ESOP only if the plan
specifically states that it is designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.”).
112. Moench, 62 F.3d at 568.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 570.
115. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA's legislative
history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114,
‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the
evolution of the law of trusts.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 533, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649)).
116. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 (1959) (noting that the terms of the trust are a
manifestation of the settlor’s external intent).
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settlor’s intent, fiduciaries may be liable for continuing to adhere to
117
the offending terms. These basic principles undergird the proposed
standard.
This Part first identifies the default settlor’s intent for ESOPs
and 401(k) plans, distinguishing the static terms of the plan from the
“terms of the trust” that are coextensive with the settlor’s intent. It
then delineates a framework to determine when plan fiduciaries have
an obligation to deviate from the static terms of the plan. Finally,
Section C addresses some practical considerations that adopting the
new standard would present.
A. Identifying the Default Settlor’s Intent for ESOPs and 401(k)
Plans
Case law and scholarship define the settlor’s intent as the
settlor’s purpose for creating the trust at the time of the trust’s
118
creation. The trust’s written terms may evince the settlor’s intent
119
but are not conclusive. Trust law instructs the court to look beyond
the written terms of the trust to the actions of the settlor and the
circumstances surrounding the trust’s creation to determine the
120
settlor’s intent in unclear situations. Because federal regulations
121
dictate some of the trust’s language, the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the trust—particularly the relationship between the
settlor and the beneficiaries, their financial situations, and the
statutory overlay—take on an increased importance.
Settlors of ESOPs and 401(k) plans do not enter into a
contractual agreement with future plan participants at the time the
plans are created. Nonetheless, contract principles are helpful in
understanding the relationship between initial plan settlors and future

117. See id. § 167(3) (“[T]he trustee is subject to liability for failure . . . to deviate from the
terms of the trust[] if he knew or should have known of the existence of [unanticipated]
circumstances [that would defeat or substantially impair the purpose of the trust.]”)
118. See generally John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law's Limits on the
Settlor's Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (discussing the origins and
limitations of the settlor’s intent).
119. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4, cmt. a. (noting that the surrounding circumstances
inform the interpretation of the settlor’s intent where the written and oral words are
insufficient).
120. Id.
121. See note 111 and accompanying text.
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plan participants vis–à–vis the settlor’s intent. The initial settlor and
plan participants bargain for their mutual benefit, and ERISA’s
statutory overlay shapes both the contract’s language and its
underlying public policy considerations. Initial plan participants defer
present cash compensation for increased capital ownership and future
123
financial security. This increased future financial security includes
consideration for the interests of plan participants’ beneficiaries,
whose interests are substantially similar to those of future plan
participants. Therefore, the interests of present and future plan
participants are effectively identical.
The settlor exchanges ownership of company stock and matching
cash contributions for an incentivized workforce and favorable tax
124
treatment. In theory ESOPs, which invest primarily in company
stock, incentivize beneficiaries by aligning their interests with those
that will increase the company’s stock price and the value of their
125
retirement accounts.
It logically follows that company stock
ownership through 401(k) plans would create similar incentives, with
a slight variation. Increased diversification in plan assets may shift
beneficiaries’ incentives from a simple alignment with the price of
company stock to a more complex sense of loyalty tied to an
increased likelihood of future financial security. In each case, the
default settlor’s intent, or purpose for creating the plan, is
incentivizing beneficiaries through some combination of capital and
cash contributions that provide future financial security and engender
goodwill.

122. Discussing a different issue involving fiduciary duties under ERISA, Professor
Langbein suggested that the contract framework may be helpful in interpreting plan terms
because, unlike donative transfers, EIAPs “arise from contract rather than gratuity.” John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 211 (1990). The piece
discusses the Court’s decision not to use contract law to determine the terms of a benefits plan
at some length, and suggests that it would have provided more “candor” than attempting to
operate exclusively in trust law. Id. at 223–29.
123. See generally DOUGLAS KRUSE ET AL., MOTIVATING EMPLOYEE-OWNERS IN ESOP
FIRMS: HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE (2004), available at
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19930/1/Motivating_Employee_Owners_in_ESOP_Firms_Human_Resou
rce_Policies_and_Company_Performance.pdf (discussing the incentive structure and
effectiveness of ESOPs).
124. See Douglas L. Kruse, Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership
Plans?, 34 BRIT. J.I.R. 515 (1996).
125. See Kruse, supra note 58 (discussing the empirical research on the motivational effect
of ESOPs).
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B. A Framework to Determine When the Settlor’s Intent Requires
Plan Fiduciaries to Deviate from Fixed Plan Terms
As long as the settlor’s intent is not illegal, impossible, or against
public policy, the trustee generally has an obligation to adhere to the
126
terms of the trust. But the doctrine of deviation, which is notably
absent from the Moench opinion, requires fiduciaries to depart from
the static terms of the trust when they know or should know that, due
to unanticipated circumstances, the terms no longer effectuate the
127
settlor’s intent. The following framework proposes a process for
identifying when unanticipated circumstances require EIAP
fiduciaries to deviate from the terms of the plan.
1. What Percentage of the EIAP’s Assets are Invested in Company
Stock? ERISA requires non-EIAP retirement plans to diversify their
128
investments and forbids them from holding more than 10 percent of
129
their assets in company stock. All EIAPs are exempt from these
requirements, and different plans use this exemption to create a wide
range of investment portfolios. ESOPs, by definition, invest primarily
130
in company stock. In comparison, some 401(k) plans offer no
company stock, while others permit plan participants to hold more
131
than 80 percent of their assets in company stock. Accordingly, one
must first identify the type of plan to determine whether a fiduciary’s
decision to continue to invest in company stock—either through new
acquisitions or continued holdings—was contrary to the settlor’s
intent.
The proposed standard would apply only to EIAPs that
authorize or require fiduciaries to invest more than 20 percent of the
plan’s assets in company stock. This threshold intentionally shields
the decisions of many EIAP fiduciaries to continue to invest in
132
company stock from strict scrutiny. The trust law duty to diversify
126. Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement (Third) §
228, cmt. d [Prudent Investor Rule]).
127. See Langbein, supra note 118, at 394 n.141 (discussing the doctrine of deviation).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1107.
130. See Part I.B.1.
131. See VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (noting that 6 percent of the survey
respondents participated in 401(k) plans that invested more than 80 percent of their assets in
company stock).
132. Many 401(k) plans do not offer an investment option that includes company stock. Id.
at 24, 26.
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And modernessentially tracks onto modern portfolio theory.
portfolio-theory-based investment advice counsels against holding
134
more than 20 percent of available funds in a single asset. Holding an
EIAP fiduciary who invests no more than 20 percent of the plan
assets in company stock to a reasonableness standard would render
135
meaningless ERISA’s exemption from the duty to diversify. For
EIAPs investing minimally in company stock, the current Moench
presumption should remain the standard for assessing fiduciary
liability.
2. What Qualifies as an Unanticipated Circumstance? When trust
fiduciaries know or should know of some circumstance unknown to
and unanticipated by the settlor that would “defeat or substantially
impair the purposes of the trust,” they may be held liable for failing to
136
deviate from the terms of the trust. In the contract law framework
discussed in Part III.A, the circumstances known or anticipated to the
settlor become those known, anticipated, and bargained for by the
initial EIAP settlor and plan participants.
Assuming that EIAP settlors and beneficiaries are rational and
137
savvy businesspeople, they would anticipate changes in the price of

133. See note 96.
134. Retirement planners, taking modern portfolio theory’s principle of diversification into
account, counsel employees against investing more than 20 percent of their assets in company
stock.
See
e.g.,
VANGUARD,
Avoid
These
Common
Pitfalls,
https://retirementplans.vanguard.com/VGApp/pe/pubeducation/retirement/Startingtosave/pitfal
ls/Pitfalls.jsf?SelectedSegment=StartingtoSave&Article=Avoid+these+common+pitfalls
(last
visited Dec. 13, 2012). Under modern portfolio theory, firm risk accounts for 20 percent of the
risk in a stock’s price. Langbein, supra note 96, at 647 (citing R.A. BREALEY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 117 (2d ed. 1983)).
135. Taking action for variations less than 20 percent due to unanticipated circumstances
would technically not be the same thing as holding fiduciaries accountable for the duty to
diversify from which they are exempted. But it functionally has the effect of requiring them to
manage more risk than is generally acceptable as regular firm risk under modern portfolio
theory. See note 134.
136. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167.
137. This is a generous assumption that favors the settlors, but is important to permit
companies to continue to operate with the level of risk permitted by the business judgment rule.
Most beneficiaries make irrational investment decisions, especially where company stock is
concerned. See Marvin H. Stroud, “Don't Put Your Eggs In One Basket”: Reforming 401(K)
Pensions To Address The Educational And Psychological Issues That Drive Good Employees To
Make Bad Investment Decisions, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 437 (2010) (discussing the fact that
employees typically aren’t savvy investors and make poor investing decisions, especially when
presented with an investment option that includes company stock).
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company stock due to market fluctuations. They also anticipate
139
price changes resulting from industry-related hiccups, and recognize
that decisions made by the business firm and its agents would affect
the stock price. But does the resulting EIAP represent beneficiaries’
acquiescence in all forces that may affect stock price, whether
stemming from financial markets, the company’s industry, the firm
itself, or natural forces? Rational settlors and beneficiaries realize
that they are incapable of controlling the market, specific industries,
natural disasters, and potentially costly fluke litigation. But all should
be understood to bargain with the understanding that they are
rational individuals and that the company will be managed rationally.
When viewed as a contract between two rational parties, EIAP
documents should be understood to implicitly exclude irrational
business decisions from the list of acceptable reasons for changes in
the price of the company’s stock. Therefore, unanticipated
circumstances that may warrant deviation from the terms of an EIAP
include situations in which companies and their agents conduct
themselves irrationally.
The business judgment rule provides ample guidance for
determining when business decisions are irrational. The business
judgment rule affords corporate directors or officers a presumption
that they fulfilled their duties of care in partaking in a business
judgment, provided, in part, that they:
(2) [are] informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment . . . reasonably believe[d] to be appropriate under the
circumstances;
and
(3) rationally believe[] the business judgment is in the best
140
interests of the corporation.
141

This has been a high standard for most plaintiffs to meet, but
EIAP fiduciaries need not litigate the business-judgment rule to the

138. See Langbein, supra note 96, at 647, n.47 (noting that individuals familiar with modern
portfolio theory ascribed very specific risk profiles firm risk, market risk, industry risk, etc.).
139. Id.
140. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (2012); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (articulating the business judgment rule to require that directors and officers act “on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company”).
141. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule: The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL.
U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) (“[T]he business judgment rule] could be called a standard of non-
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fullest extent. Instead, if a reasonable plan fiduciary would conclude
that company directors’ actions were irrational because they were
142
made in bad faith or on improper information, EIAP fiduciaries
should recognize that an unanticipated circumstance has occurred.
3. Is Continued Investment in Company Stock Still Consistent
with the Settlor’s Intent? Under trust law, trustees may be subject to
liability for failing to deviate from the terms of the trust if complying
143
with the terms no longer effectuates the settlor’s intent. The manner
in which the court determines whether a fiduciaries’ deviation was
justified depends on the circumstances when the deviation took place,
and, in some instances, the circumstances when the deviation is
before the court. If the deviation occurred during an “emergency,”
the court will approve the deviation if the court would have approved
the deviation based on the information available at the time of the
144
deviation. If the court would not have approved the decision based
on information available at the time of the deviation, it will not
145
approve the deviation. In nonemergency situations, the court will
approve the deviation if it would have approved the deviation based
on the information available at the time of the deviation, and the
court would still approve the deviation based on information
146
available “at the time the deviation is before the court.” It may
approve the deviation if the court would not have approved the
deviation at the time it occurred, but would have at the time it is
147
before the court. But, in nonemergency situations, the court will not
approve a deviation from the terms of the trust “if the deviation is
such that the court would not have authorized it at the time when the
148
propriety of the deviation is before the court.”
For practical purposes discussed in Part III.C, it makes sense to
use the emergency standard to assess an EIAP fiduciary’s decision to
review, entailing no review of the merits of a business decision corporate officials have made.”
(citing DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 7.01-720 (1993))).
142. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
143. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167. The Restatement permits trustees to petition
the court for the ability to deviate for plan documents, but for reasons discussed in Part III.C,
this discussion only discusses instances where the trustee deviates from the express terms of the
trust without first seeking the court’s permission.
144. Id. § 167, cmt. f.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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continue with or deviate from plan terms. If company stock makes up
more than 20 percent of an EIAP’s assets, and an unanticipated
circumstance occurs, EIAP fiduciaries must determine whether
continued investment in company stock is consistent with the settlor’s
intent of incentivizing beneficiaries through providing retirement
income and engendering goodwill. At what specific point must
reasonable EIAP fiduciaries deviate from the express terms of the
plan? The answer to this question will vary case-by-case, depending
on the probable effect of the unanticipated circumstance on the price
of the stock and the total percentage of company stock in the EIAP.
In ESOPs and other EIAPs with high concentrations of company
stock, the potential of relatively small decreases in stock price—15 to
25 percent—that result from unanticipated circumstances that a
reasonable fiduciary would attribute to violations of the business
judgment rule would trigger a duty to deviate from the terms of the
149
plan. But as an EIAP’s concentration of company stock approaches
20 percent, the potential decrease in stock price necessary to trigger a
duty to deviate from the terms of the plan would also increase. And,
as discussed in Part III.B.1, the Moench presumption would continue
to apply to EIAPs that invest no more than 20 percent of their assets
150
in company stock.
At first glance, this sliding-scale inverse standard seems to evade
ERISA’s exemption of EIAPs from the duty to diversify. However,
the relationship only empowers fiduciaries to carry out the settlor’s
intent of incentivizing employees’ performance. Following the same
logic used to support ESOPs, employees become demoralized, not
incentivized, when they lose large amounts of their retirement savings
due their employer’s irrational business activities. This standard
simply accounts for the unarticulated agreement between an EIAP
settlor and initial—and future—plan participants.

149. Reasonable minds will differ on the low-end percentage of the stock price decrease
range. On one hand, it is conceivable to want to compensate EIAPs for any losses due to
irrational business decisions, regardless of how small. And these suits could serve as an
encouragement for companies to refrain from making decisions that violate the businessjudgment rule. On the other hand, there is a point where the cost of defending and settling these
cases outweighs the benefit they bring to the plans. Because modern portfolio theory attributes
20 percent of a stock’s performance to the company’s business decisions, I set the range around
this mark.
150. I am grateful for Professor Deborah DeMott’s analogy between this approach and the
Second Circuit’s definition of reasonable care in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Practical Considerations

This proposed standard presents several practical challenges.
First and foremost, EIAPs, employers, and employees risk losing
their favorable tax treatment when plan fiduciaries deviate from the
151
expressly written terms of the plan. Employees, employers, and plan
152
participants would all face immediate tax liabilities. Congress could
fix this problem by changing the Internal Revenue Code to exempt
necessary deviations from new tax liability. But encouraging plan
drafters to include a clause that permits deviation from the plans’
initial terms in the case of unanticipated circumstances may offer a
153
more simple solution. The Department of Labor could force the
point by issuing new regulations mandating terms to be included in all
EIAPs—akin to the Internal Revenue Service’s regulation of terms
154
that must appear in ESOPs.
After addressing the tax issue, the question of how plan
fiduciaries on the ground will deviate from the initial plan terms
remains. As noted in Part III.B.3, the Restatement permits trustees to
petition the court for permission to deviate from the terms of the trust
and establishes liability for breach of fiduciary duty when they fail to
petition the court under certain circumstances. But EIAP fiduciaries
instructed by plan documents to invest in company stocks face a
problem when they petition the court. As this Note articulates the
proposed rule, EIAP fiduciaries would petition the court only when
they reasonably believed continuing to invest in company stock was
imprudent, in light of what they reasonably understood to be conduct
inconsistent with the business judgment rule. But if fiduciaries
actually petitioned the court in such a manner, they would risk

151. Failure to follow term plans results in plan disqualification. Revenue Procedure 94-62,
1994-2
C.B.
778.
See
also
Tax
Consequences
of
Plan
Disqualification,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Tax-Consequences-of-Plan-Disqualification (last visited
Jan. 15, 2013) (citing Rev. Rul. 2007-48, 2007-30 I.R.B. 129 and Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-1 C.B.
154).
152. Tax Consequences of Plan Disqualification, supra note 151.
153. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167, cmt. d (“Where terms of the trust provide
for change of circumstances. The settlor may manifest an intention to authorize the trustee, in
the event of a change of circumstances, to do acts not otherwise authorized, if such acts are
necessary to prevent a defeat or substantial impairment of the purposes of the trust. In such case
it is not necessary for the trustee to apply to the court for permission to do the act, since it is not
a deviation from the terms of the trust to do the act.”).
154. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11(b) (“A plan constitutes an ESOP only if the plan
specifically states that it is designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.”).
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exacerbating the feared decrease in stock price. Accordingly, an
155
extrajudicial deviation—as the Restatement provides for —would
likely be necessary to minimize any additional negative impact on the
stock’s price. In a similar vein, deviating EIAP fiduciaries would face
the difficult task of determining the proper method of deviation.
Because an EIAP often holds substantial amounts of company stock,
a sell-off risks decreasing the price of the company’s stock, which is
156
precisely what the fiduciary seeks to avoid. These concerns may
have the long-term effect of limiting EIAP options that invest more
157
than 20 percent of their assets in company stock.
IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD TO EIAP FIDUCIARIES
As a threshold matter, the proposed standard successfully
addresses several concerns raised by Moench and its progeny. It
provides clear, objective standards for when an EIAP fiduciary has an
obligation to deviate from the terms of a plan. It does not subject
EIAP fiduciaries to the duty to diversify or threaten to turn ESOPs
into ordinary pension benefit plans. In the absence of congressional
action on the tax issue, plan drafters can simply add a clause that
allows temporary deviation. And, depending on the reason why and
manner in which an EIAP fiduciary deviates from the terms of the
158
plan, it may not raise any insider-trading concerns.

155. Restatement (Second) Trusts § 167, cmt. f , illus. 23.
156. See Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 256 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[F]rom a
practical standpoint, compelling fiduciaries to sell off a plan's holdings of company stock may
bring about precisely the result plaintiffs seek to avoid: a drop in the stock price.”).
157. Creating a playbook for the deviating EIAP fiduciary is beyond the scope of this Note,
but here are a few brief suggestions for how a fiduciary might handle this issue. Because the
entire purpose of the EIAP is to align the interests of the settlor and beneficiaries, fiduciaries
may look to the company for help in stabilizing the stock price during and after a deviation.
Perhaps, provided securities regulations allow, the company could buy back some of the EIAPs
outstanding stocks. As an additional option, EIAP fiduciaries could attempt to decrease its
holdings and maintain the stock price by selling off the stock in large blocks and repurchasing
small percentages. Alternatively, the EIAP could maintain its holding of company stock at
current levels, but decrease the volume of stock it purchases, offsetting its exposure with OTC
equity swaps. Again, resolving this issue is beyond the scope of this note, but adoption of the
proposed standard will require fiduciaries to develop a system of best practices for deviating
from express plan terms.
158. Courts have yet to tackle the question of insider trading relating to stock-drop suits
because the case has yet to present itself. It is plausible, in light of the countervailing policy
concerns of maintaining the retirement account, that the S.E.C. would refrain from prosecuting
for insider trades related to fulfilling EIAP fiduciary duties. It is also not clear that deviating
EIAP fiduciaries would meet the scienter requirement. See S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286 (2d
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To compare and contrast the proposed standard and the Moench
159
presumption, consider the examples from the Introduction. In each
of these scenarios, the plaintiffs failed to overcome the Moench
presumption because the company’s viability was not threatened. The
standard proposed in this Note would likely reach the same
conclusion in all but one of these scenarios, albeit for different
160
reasons.
In the first example, the EIAP does not meet the new standard’s
threshold requirement of mandating more than a 20 percent
investment in company stock. Thus, the Moench presumption applies.
Because a “dire situation” did not threaten the company’s viability or
future existence—but more importantly, because 20 percent is within
the diversification range for single assets posited by modern portfolio
theory—continued investment in the company stock was not
imprudent.
In contrast, the EIAP from the second example would meet the
20 percent investment requirement. And because a reasonable
fiduciary could consider the company’s false statements to violate the
business judgment rule, an unanticipated circumstance has occurred.
But the decrease in stock price is too small to “defeat or substantially
impair” the plan’s purpose—here, incentivizing employees by
increasing their capital ownership, providing them with a retirement
161
account, and aligning their goals with those of the company.
The third example is less straightforward than the first two sets
of facts, thereby highlighting the emphasis the proposed standard
would place on pleading adequate facts to state a claim. The plan
meets the threshold company stock requirement, but the fact pattern
does not provide enough information to determine whether plan
fiduciaries have an obligation to deviate from the terms of the plan
document. The major deficiency is that the fact pattern does not
specify whether anticipated circumstances—recalls are routine
business practice—or unanticipated circumstances—the fraudulent
accounting practices—caused the decrease in price. To plead
Cir. 2012) (“Liability for securities fraud requires proof of scienter, defined as ‘a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976))).
159. Supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
160. These cases do not contain information about what fiduciaries would have estimated
the decreased stock price to be, based on the available information. I assume that a reasonable
fiduciary would estimate somewhere within 5 percent of the actual figures.
161. See generally Krouse, supra note 123.
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sufficient facts to state a claim, the plan plaintiffs would need to
disaggregate the causes of the stock drop and plausibly allege that the
fraudulent accounting practices accounted for an adequate portion of
the decrease in the price drop. Using the new standard, a court would
likely dismiss the complaint without prejudice and grant the plaintiffs
leave to amend the complaint instead of outright dismissing it, as
would happen under Moench.
The proposed standard’s divergence from the Moench
presumption is most evident in the fourth and final example. In
162
Kirshbaum v. Reliant Energy, the case underlying case this scenario,
corporate officers with knowledge of the stock trading practices that
163
artificially inflated the stock’s price served as EIAP fiduciaries. The
164
SEC mounted an investigation into Reliant Energy’s practices, the
165
company was forced to restate its earning, and it settled a sizeable
166
lawsuit stemming from claims associated with its trading practices.
Despite the overwhelming evidence of deceptive practices and the
large losses to the company’s EIAP, the court found no breach of
fiduciary duty. Instead, the case ensconced the Moench presumption
167
in the Fifth Circuit.
Applying the proposed standard, a court should reach a different
conclusion. The plan greatly exceeded the 20 percent company stock
requirement. And in light of the fact that plan fiduciaries knew of the
trading activities and those activities prompted an SEC investigation,
a reasonable plan fiduciary should easily conclude that the conduct in
question fell outside the business judgment rule. Finally, the
magnitude of the plan’s concentration of company stock and the
potential decrease in stock price increased the statistical likelihood of
large losses in employees’ retirement accounts, which implies that the
plan’s fiduciaries would have an obligation to deviate from the terms
of the plan to continue to fulfill the settlor’s intent of incentivizing
employees.
These illustrations demonstrate that, like the Moench
presumption, the proposed standard focuses neither on maximizing
162. Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 247.
164. Stephen
Taub,
Reliant,
Deloitte
Settle
with
Investors,
CFO.COM,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/4243831, Aug. 1, 2005.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Kirschbaum, 536 F.3d at 254 (“The Moench presumption logically applies to any
allegations of fiduciary duty breach for failure to divest an EIAP or ESOP of company stock.”).
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plans’ profits nor minimizing plan losses. Unlike the Moench
presumption, however, the proposed standard seeks to honor the
settlor’s intent in an objective, logical, and doctrinally supported
manner.
CONCLUSION
When it decided Moench v. Robertson, The Third Circuit left
several questions unanswered:
How is an ESOP fiduciary to determine when diversification is in
the best interest of the beneficiaries? Is the fiduciary always to seek
the return-maximizing investment, or is there some nontangible
loyalty interest served by retaining ESOP investments in employer
stock? Additionally, to what extent should ESOPs be considered
retirement plans, notwithstanding the qualification contained in
most of them, including Statewide’s, that they are not designed to
168
guarantee retirement income?

By providing an objective framework within which plan
participants and trustees may set their expectations and evaluate the
merits of claims and defenses, the proposed standard answers the first
two questions posed in Moench. The emergence of ESOPs and 401(k)
plans as the most popular retirement accounts for private employees
answers the last question.
From a public policy perspective, the United States should not
adhere to a standard that does not recognize and protect the social
policy that undergirds ERISA retirement plans—even those plans
that it exempts from the duty to diversify. EIAP fiduciaries will need
to develop methods for deviating from the plans of the term without
exacerbating price drops resulting from companies’ violations of the
business judgment rule. But perhaps the real value of the proposed
standard is the work it does in aligning the goals of plan beneficiaries,
fiduciaries, and the companies that sponsor the plans.
This Note glossed over one final detail, which is that corporate
directors and officers frequently serve as EIAP fiduciaries. One
possibility is that the proposed standard might encourage companies
to establish EIAPs with company stock ownership requirements in
the range of conventionally acceptable risk that would be subject only
168.

Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995).
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to the Moench presumption. Considering the fact that the retirement
accounts of over fifteen million Americans are at stake, many would
consider this to be a welcome development. But this outcome is
unlikely. If companies abandoned EIAPs, they would miss the
favorable tax treatment and the ability to use the plans as tools of
corporate finance. By holding fiduciaries accountable for companies’
irrational business decisions that decrease the value of employees’
retirement accounts, the standard should encourage certain
fiduciaries—namely those who are also corporate directors or
officers—to self-regulate their behavior and police the behavior of
their nonfiduciary counterparts who are also company agents to limit
potential liability while continuing to reap the benefits of EIAPs.

